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NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS AND MIDDLE
EAST STABILITY
Assessing the Impact of a Smaller US Nuclear
Arsenal
James A. Russell
The United States faces a series of strategic and policy conundrums as it attempts to promote
strategic stability in the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East. This article examines the
relationship between a reduced US nuclear arsenal and strategic stability in the Persian Gulf and
the Middle East. It argues that a series of interrelated political and military factors play a much
more significant role in regional security and stability than the US strategic arsenal, which has
never, with a few extraordinary exceptions, played a direct role in maintaining regional security.
The United States has constructed a system of regional stability based on conventional deterrence
and defense that has seen it forward base forces at various installations in the region in
combination with efforts to arm, train, and equip host-nation militaries. Nuclear weapons have
never played a prominent role in this regional system. Evidence presented in this article suggests
that there is no compelling reason for the United States to abandon and/or modify the defensive
system of conventional deterrence and defense by adding nuclear-backed guarantees to the mix.
KEYWORDS: Nuclear weapons; extended deterrence; Middle East; Iran; Saudi Arabia; Gulf
Cooperation Council
As the United States gradually but inexorably reduces the number of strategic nuclear
weapons in its arsenal, it will inevitably have to re-examine the role of nuclear weapons as
an instrument of its security strategy. During the Cold War, its nuclear arsenal provided the
ultimate guarantee of national survival and, at the same time, underpinned the framework
of collective security constructed under the strategy of containment until the Soviet Union
collapsed in 1991.
With the end of the ColdWar, successive US administrations grappled with identifying
a role for these weapons while simultaneously reducing the stockpile; the 31,255 nuclear
warheads operational in 1967 have today been reduced to an estimated 4,650.1 Successive
versions of the congressionally-mandated Nuclear Posture Review have identified a number
of missions for the dwindling US arsenal: protecting the homeland, assuring friends and
allies of our continuing commitment to their security, and deterring attacks on or threats to
the United States and its allies by state- and non-state actors, to name a few.
In April 2009, President Barack Obama declared his desire for a world free of nuclear
weapons.2 In pursuit of this overall objective, the Obama administration concluded the
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New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (or New START) with Russia in April 2011, that
commits Russia and the United States to reduce their respective stockpiles to 1,550
deployed strategic warheads by February 2018. Whether these reductions represent a stop
along the path to complete nuclear disarmament is, of course, unknown.
This article examines the relationship between a reduced US nuclear arsenal and
strategic stability in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. The first section addresses the
regional security environment, regional nuclear dynamics, and the problems with applying
extended nuclear deterrent commitments to the region. The second section addresses the
implications of the reduced arsenal for US regional strategy and policy. The article argues
that, with a few extraordinary exceptions, the US strategic arsenal has never played a direct
role in maintaining regional security; as such, lower numbers of nuclear weapons will not
significantly affect security and stability in the Middle East, which derives, rather, from
several interrelated political and military factors. First, while the United States has made
bilateral commitments to defend a number of regional states from external threats, it has
never pledged publicly to defend those states with nuclear weapons and is unlikely to do so
in the near future.3 Instead, the United States has successfully pursued a system of
conventional deterrence and defense throughout the region*arming its friends and allies
with a range of offensive and defensive conventional weapons over the last quarter century.
Evidence suggests that there is no compelling reason for the United States to abandon or
modify the defensive system of conventional deterrence and defense by adding nuclear-
backed guarantees to the mix. Second, it is unlikely that the regional states themselves
either want or desire US nuclear guarantees and instead prefer to continue current security
arrangements that leave US nuclear weapons out of the equation. These calculations could
change if Iran becomes a nuclear weapon state. Third, and more generally, the conceptual
relationship between nuclear guarantees and numbers of nuclear weapons has always been
unclear.4 Extended deterrence and nuclear guarantees are essentially political commitments
that have always depended more on the perceived credibility of the commitment than on
the weapons required to operationalize them. With the exception of the US commitment to
defend Europe during the Cold War under the doctrine of flexible response, the United
States has always preferred tomaintain a posture of calculated ambiguity relative to the role
that nuclear weapons played in security guarantees conveyed to its allies.5 This preference
served the interests of the guarantee’s conveyor (the United States) as well as its recipients.
In the Middle East, it is difficult to imagine that*even if the pro-US ruling elites
wanted nuclear-backed security guarantees*they would have any basis for informed
views about the numbers of actual weapons necessary to operationalize the guarantees. It
is equally difficult to imagine that US planners would want to discuss nuclear targeting
requirements with these regional allies. All of these factors argue against a direct
relationship between the size and composition of the US nuclear arsenal and the security
guarantees extended by the United States to protect its regional interests.
Regional Environment and the Balance of Power
There are few areas of the world persistently more troubled by war and instability than the
Middle East, a region marked by recurring interstate disputes which have led to three
264 JAMES A. RUSSELL
major interstate wars in the last fifty years (the Arab-Israeli wars in 1967 and 1973*the Six
Day War and the Yom Kippur War, respectively*as well as the 1980!88 Iran-Iraq war) and
two sizable military interventions by outside military powers (1991’s Operation Desert
Storm and the 2003 US invasion of Iraq). In addition, one could argue that the Israeli wars
of independence that began with the formation of the state in 1948 and continue
to this day remain a source of regional friction. This instability makes the region a
particularly troublesome proliferation environment and an equally difficult environment
for the United States to discern how best to execute strategies of deterrence and defense
that involve conventional and/or nuclear weapons. The analysis in this section highlights
the difficulties facing US strategic planners in attempting to operationalize these
strategies.
Since the upheavals of the so-called Arab Spring that began in late 2010, intra-
national political contention and, in some cases, violent conflicts have emerged across the
region in varying forms of intensity. Syria is in the midst of a brutal and violent contest for
political power; Egypt’s political transition away from the secular-era autocracies to Islamic
democracy may yet turn violent; Bahrain’s protesters are subjected to violent, coercive
pressure from the government; levels of violence in Iraq have returned to levels not seen
since the beginning of the 2003 US occupation; and there have been protests in Jordan
and Kuwait as well. These upheavals represent part of a process that may take a
generation or more as the Cold War-era ruling elites are pressured by their restive
populations to institute new and more representative forms of governance. This process
will invariably lead to the emergence of new governments and decision-making elites that
will have their own views on how best to protect their states from external threats and
whether they want to continue outsourcing that protection to the United States.
Interstate tensions remain a persistent and prominent feature of the regional
environment. Israel confronts two implacably hostile foes in Hamas, which governs the
Gaza Strip, and Hezbollah, which controls southern Lebanon and exerts strong influence in
the Lebanese government.6 Israel and Hamas battered each other for several weeks in
November 2012, and Israel and Hezbollah fought a month-long war in 2006. Absent a
political settlement, Israel’s state of hostilities will continue with Hamas, and most believe
that another war between Hezbollah and Israel is all but inevitable. Moreover, the new
government in Cairo has evinced a more ambivalent attitude towards Israel and the 1979
Camp David Accords than its predecessor. Although unlikely, Egypt’s withdrawal from its
peace treaty with Israel would represent further deterioration in an already unstable
environment.
Open Israeli-Iranian hostility represents the region’s most destabilizing interstate
tension: a standoff between a nuclear-armed and a non-nuclear state. This asymmetry is an
undeniable and dangerous aspect of their hostile relationship. Over the past few years,
Israel has reportedly pressed the United States to attack Iran, and has engaged in a variety
of hostile acts against the Islamic Republic to disrupt its nuclear program. It has sponsored
the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists in Iran and cooperated with the United States
in mounting a cyberattack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.7 Iran has responded to these
provocations with its own cyberattacks and is believed to be behind attacks on Israeli
targets outside Israel.8 Israel’s strategic circumstances and its face-off with Iran are
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particularly important for the issues addressed in this article due to the unconditional
commitment to its security by the United States.
These regional interstate tensions are further complicated by an additional cross-
cutting set of regional rivalries involving Gulf states, Iran, and Israel. As leader of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC), Saudi Arabia sees itself as the primary regional power to
counter Iran’s quest for regional dominance. These two regional heavyweights are divided
by history, religion, political ideology, and their alliance relationships. All the GCC states,
which also include Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman, have
aligned themselves with the United States and, to varying degrees, have actively supported
US efforts to contain Iran’s regional influence. Importantly, however, the GCC states do not
all share a common strategic outlook, and the smaller sheikdoms*with the exception of
Bahrain*remain wary of Saudi power and influence on the Arabian Peninsula and do not
want to be seen as too closely tied to the Al Saud regime. All these states have
comprehensive security partnerships with the United States operationalized through
bilateral agreements that provide the political framework for military and security
cooperation through arms sales, military exercises, prepositioned military equipment on
their soil, and the presence of US military personnel. While these states share US interests in
containing Iranian power, they do not share its unconditional support for Israel and instead
remain on hostile terms with the Jewish state. The United States today maintains friendly
relations with these states that, to varying degrees, have hostile relationships with one
another. These complex political relationships between erstwhile US allies greatly
complicate today’s system of conventional deterrence and defense, to say nothing of the
difficulties that these relationships would present to a system of regional security that
attempted to also include security guarantees backed by the US strategic arsenal.
In addition to interstate tensions and intrastate upheavals, the regional balance of
power is today more uncertain than at any time in recent history. The balance contains a
number of crosscutting features that affect the region’s nuclear dynamics in ways relevant
for US strategies of deterrence and defense.
Ever since the formation of the partnership with Saudi Arabia in the 1940s, the
United States has aligned itself politically and strategically with the Sunni monarchies.
Following the 1967 war, the United States replaced France as Israel’s principal arms
supplier and built a comprehensive political and security relationship that has positioned
Israel as one of the United States’s closest allies in the world. After the 1973 war, the
United States also drew Egypt into this basic alignment in which the Sunni states, while
hostile to Israel, agreed on the need to limit Iran’s influence. Following the UK withdrawal
from the Gulf in 1971, the United States eventually took on the United Kingdom’s
responsibilities and became the protector of the Sunni monarchies on the Arabian
Peninsula. The United States set about arming, training, and equipping the militaries of its
regional allies through the Foreign Military Sales program, which provides money to states
like Egypt, Israel, and Jordan to purchase US equipment. By contrast, Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf States purchased their own weapons by recycling billions of petrodollars back to the
United States. The United States remains the principal supplier of defense equipment,
training, and military education to most of the region’s militaries, with upwards of $60
billion in additional sales of equipment over the last five years. A disruption in this system
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occurred in 1979 with the Islamic revolution in Iran and the takeover of the US Embassy
in Tehran that soured the once close relationship between these two states. Since
the 1979 Islamic Revolution, a central unifying objective of the US-backed Sunni states
and Israel has been to prevent Iran from achieving regional political and military
dominance.
Before 2003, Iraq and Saudi Arabia formed an important part of the regional balance,
serving as the de facto frontline Sunni-dominated states in the standoff with Iran.
Ironically, the US invasion and occupation of Iraq altered this system due to the
emergence of the Shi’a government in Iraq drawn largely from elements of the Islamic
Supreme Council of Iraq, or SCIRI, which lived in exile in Iran for 25 years before the US
invasion. Iraq is now widely considered to have a strong political relationship with Iran
following the departure of US forces in 2011. For its part, Iran allied itself with an anti-
Sunni and anti-US bloc that included Syria and Hezbollah, which now occupies southern
Lebanon. The two regional blocs are now facing off against each in various regional hot
spots*a rivalry vividly on display in Syria where Iran is trying to prevent the downfall of its
long-time ally, Bashar Assad, while the Gulf States are supporting the various opposition
factions trying to topple the Assad regime.
This basic system of regional balancing is still in place today with some important
uncertainties introduced by the Arab Spring. Egypt’s position in this regional balance and
its relationship to the United States is in question due to the ascendance of the Muslim
Brotherhood and the election of Mohamed Morsi as president in June 2012. Following
anti-US protests in Cairo in September 2012, President Obama stated, ‘‘I don’t think we
would consider [the current Egyptian regime] an ally, but we don’t consider them an
enemy.’’9 During a visit to the United States in September 2012, Morsi called for the United
States to fundamentally change its relationship with the Arab world*further reinforcing
the changes in the US-Egyptian relationship under the new government.10 In addition to
questions surrounding Egypt’s relationship with the United States, it remains to be seen
what kind of relationship Cairo will have with the Gulf monarchies and Iran. Egypt had a
hostile relationship with Iran during Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s rule, and,
together with Saudi Arabia, constituted the Sunni counterweight to Iran in the region.
During a visit to Tehran to attend the Non-Aligned Movement summit in September 2012,
Morsi joined Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s support for the Islamist rebels in
Syria and positioned Egypt as supporting popular sentiments throughout the region for an
end to autocratic and authoritarian rule.11 Egypt’s role in the regional balance of power
throws into question the Cold War-era balance between the Sunni states, aligned with the
United States, and Iran.
For the United States, Egypt’s political evolution disrupts what had emerged as an
informal regional bloc of Israel, Saudi Arabia (plus the GCC), and Egypt, aligned with the
United States against Iran. With relations between these regional states on uncertain
footing, it is more difficult for the United States to stitch together a system of regional
deterrence and defense against rising Iranian regional power and influence; integrating
nuclear weapons into this complicated system becomes virtually impossible.
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Regional Nuclear Dynamics
Throughout the Cold War, the United States viewed nuclear guarantees as a double-edged
sword that simultaneously deterred foes from attacking allies while also deterring allies
from developing their own nuclear weapons. As such, the strategic arsenal functioned as
an important nonproliferation tool. Applying such a system in the Middle East would be
difficult, if not impossible, given the region’s complex nuclear dynamics. The region today
contains states with different histories and interests in nuclear weapons and/or nuclear
power.12
All the regional states except Israel have signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and have, in theory, committed themselves to permanent non-
nuclear status. These NPT commitments, however, have not prevented several regional
states from pursuing clandestine nuclear programs. Iraq pursued an aggressive clandes-
tine nuclear program after Israel destroyed its French-supplied reactor in 1981. Iraq’s
program went undetected until United Nations arms inspectors arrived in 1991 to verify
compliance with the cease-fire agreement embodied in UN Security Council Resolution
687, which demanded, among other things, that Iraq give up all its weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) programs. Libya also pursued a clandestine nuclear program after
purchasing a variety of equipment from Pakistani scientist and nuclear black marketeer,
Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan. Libya voluntarily abandoned its program in December 2003,
and its equipment today remains warehoused at the US Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge
National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.13 Syria pursued a clandestine nuclear
program with North Korean assistance until September 2007, when Israeli fighters
destroyed a reactor under construction at Al Kibar.14 Israel’s nuclear program was also
developed clandestinely in the 1960s with French assistance, and Israel is today a de facto
nuclear state that remains outside the NPT regime.
Egypt’s interest in nuclear power dates to the mid-1950s, when President Gamal
Abdel Nasser concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union for assistance on a nuclear
program. After its defeat in the Six-Day War, Egypt gave up its pursuit of nuclear weapons
and signed the NPT in 1968. It continues to lead efforts to create a WMD-free zone in the
region. The 1995 NPT Review Conference endorsed the idea of a WMD-free zone in the
Middle East, but, despite a multitude of General Assembly resolutions and a follow-up
endorsement at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, there has been no tangible progress to
date in achieving this objective. The regional states have all used the idea of a WMD-free
zone to highlight Israel’s continued nuclear status and, more recently, to highlight
questions surrounding Iran’s nuclear program. In November 2011, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also called for a regional conference to address the issue,
but subsequently postponed the conference a year later, citing ‘‘present conditions in the
Middle East’’ and the lack of regional consensus on the way forward.15 It remains unclear
whether the initiative to create a WMD-free zone in the Middle East will ever reach fruition.
In 2006, during the Mubarak presidency, Egypt joined the cacophony of regional
states expressing re-energized interest in nuclear power.16 In July 2012, a report by the
Egyptian Ministry of Electricity and Energy further endorsed this idea, noting an annual
additional requirement for 300 megawatts of electricity that could come from nuclear
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power. The report calls for the construction of four nuclear reactors between 2019 and
2025. During a visit to China in August 2012, Morsi is rumored to have requested $3 billion
in assistance to help finance Egypt’s nuclear power projects.17
Among regional NPT signatories, Iran clearly represents the most serious candidate
for nuclear proliferation and is widely believed to be pursuing a clandestine nuclear
program in contravention of its NPT commitments. Iran’s nuclear program began in the
1950s, and its first nuclear research reactor, built with US assistance, went critical in 1967.
When it signed the NPT in 1968, Iran was in the midst of an ambitious nuclear power
program that sought to construct up to twenty reactors to supply 23,000 megawatts of
electricity.18 After the fall of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1979, the newly formed
Islamic republic canceled the program, restarting it later during the Iran-Iraq war in
the early 1980s. The program achieved no notable progress until the late 1990s, when
construction began on a series of enrichment facilities using equipment bought from A.Q.
Khan and other infrastructure necessary to support its nuclear program.19
Iran’s major obstacle to making its own nuclear weapon is producing enough fissile
material (uranium enriched to a level over 90 percent or, alternatively, plutonium).
According to the IAEA, Iran has stockpiled 8,271 kilograms of uranium enriched to 3.5
percent and 280 kilograms enriched to a level of 20 percent.20 If Iran enriched its stockpile
of 3.5 percent enriched uranium to 90 percent, it would theoretically have enough fissile
material for six or seven bombs, according to the Institute for Science and International
Security.21 Enriching its uranium stockpile to these levels could be accomplished in a
clandestine facility or, alternatively, in existing facilities that are now monitored by the
IAEA. In addition to enriching its uranium stockpiles, Iran would need to move through
several steps in order to build a usable nuclear weapon: First, make a political decision to
build a bomb; second, build (and, probably, test) a device; third, miniaturize a nuclear
warhead; and fourth, mate that warhead to a long-range missile.22 Estimates vary on how
long these steps could take, ranging from one to five years.23 In congressional testimony
in the spring of 2013, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper reiterated the
assessment of previous National Intelligence Estimates that Iran has not yet decided to
build a nuclear bomb.24
Iran currently operates a research reactor along with a nuclear power plant at
Bushehr built with Russian assistance. It recently announced plans to build its own power
reactor at Darkhovin, located in eastern Iran, though it is unclear when this plant will be
completed. Iran has developed significant infrastructure to support its nuclear program,
such as sites and facilities for uranium mining, milling, production, conversion, and
enrichment, including several nuclear research centers that allegedly employ thousands of
scientists.25 Iran clearly possesses the human capital, industrial infrastructure, and the
money to build a nuclear weapon if it chooses to do*an act that would require it to
withdraw from the NPT and face international obloquy.
The United States identified Iran as a country of proliferation concern in the 1970s. In
2002, the National Council for Resistance in Iran disclosed the existence of a uranium
enrichment reprocessing facility at Natanz capable of holding up to 50,000 centrifuges and
a heavy water reactor at Arak*both undeclared facilities operating without IAEA
oversight.26 The heavy water reactor will produce spent fuel from which plutonium could
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be extracted for use in a nuclear weapon. In 2009, the United States, France, and the
United Kingdom gave evidence to the IAEA that Iran had constructed another uranium
enrichment facility at Fordow, near the city of Qom, a facility believed to hold up to 3,000
gas centrifuges.27 Iran is today enriching uranium at Esfahan and Fordow.
Iran is currently in a standoff with the international community over the status of its
nuclear power program and has stonewalled the IAEA’s requests for information about
possible research and experiments on a nuclear weapon. The United Nations demanded
that Iran cease its uranium enrichment activities in 2003 following the disclosures of the
unmonitored sites. Iran initially acceded to this request in October 2003, as part of an
agreement with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom to implement the IAEA’s
Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/540), otherwise known as the
Additional Protocol. Iran signed the protocol in December 2003 but never ratified it. It
stopped adhering to the protocol in early 2006 and resumed uranium enrichment. The
Additional Protocol gives the IAEA additional authority to monitor undeclared sites and to
demand information from member states. Iran is currently denying the IAEA some
information about its nuclear program.28
The IAEA and a variety of states are particularly concerned over potential
procurement activities and experiments that may be part of a nuclear weapon program.
Since 2007, the UN Security Council has passed seven resolutions demanding that Iran
suspend its uranium enrichment activities and imposing a variety of sanctions, including
an arms embargo, in response to Iran’s noncompliance.
An additional complicating element in the region’s nuclear posture is a resurgent
interest in nuclear energy. During 2006 and 2007, thirteen states in the Middle East/North
Africa region unexpectedly announced plans to pursue nuclear energy.29 Some of these
plans*such as those for Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain*represent a
minimal proliferation threat, since they do not plan to include an indigenous uranium
enrichment capability, a critical building block for a weapons program. Still, and despite
assurances by Middle Eastern regional leaders that their programs will represent ‘‘models’’
for other states seeking peaceful nuclear programs, others fear that these programs
nevertheless create opportunities for clandestine nuclear programs and a new and
destabilizing nuclear arms race.30
Predictions of a regional nuclear arms race*or a nuclear ‘‘cascade’’*have gathered
momentum in the wake of Iran’s continuing standoff with the international community.
Some believe that the region’s nuclear posture would undergo a systemic change if Iran
either developed a nuclear weapon or achieved nuclear ‘‘latency,’’ in which it could build a
weapon reasonably quickly if it chose to do so.31 Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff
researchers dramatically declared in 2008 that: ‘‘An Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon
or a nuclear weapons capability would dramatically shift the balance of power among Iran
and its three most powerful neighbors*Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. This shift in the
balance of power could spark a regional nuclear arms race as Iran’s neighbors seek to
redress the new power imbalance.’’32 Saudi Arabia is often identified as the most likely
candidate for proliferation due to its deep pockets and history as bankroller of Pakistan’s
illicit nuclear weapons program.33 Neither Saudi Arabia nor the rest of the GCC states
could realistically build their own weapons because they lack the human and industrial
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infrastructure necessary for such a massive undertaking. Moreover, all the GCC states
continue to abide by*and take quite seriously*their NPT commitments. Some, however,
believe that Saudi Arabia would either purchase or simply station a Pakistani device on its
territory if Iran becomes a nuclear weapon state.34
While the regional states view Iran’s nuclear program with alarm and would certainly
not welcome Iran’s entry into the nuclear club, it is nonetheless difficult to imagine these
states changing their nuclear posture and withdrawing from the NPT in response to such a
development. There would be significant political costs to such a step, which would
threaten the continued political and economic integration of these states into the global
community. The GCC states are principally interested in making money in international
energy markets and need stable and peaceful political relationships to underpin their
customer relationships. Changing their nuclear status could put these relationships at risk
and disrupt the revenue generating activities upon which the regimes*and their
continued survival*depend. Perhaps most importantly, changing their nuclear status
could permanently alter their security relations with the United States, which protects all
these states from external threats*a mission that none of the GCC regimes have ever
taken particularly seriously despite spending billions on defense equipment. Outsourcing
that protection to the United States remains a good deal politically, economically, and
militarily for the GCC.
Israel is today the region’s only nuclear-armed regional state with an arsenal that
numbers somewhere between 80 and 400 weapons.35 Israel is believed to have mated
nuclear warheads with its long-range Jericho missiles, and, according to some reports, has
deployed nuclear weapons on board its German-supplied conventionally powered
submarines.36 Israel today remains an undeclared nuclear power that operates under a
doctrine of ‘‘opacity’’ in which it neither confirms nor denies the existence of its nuclear
arsenal.37 After becoming a nuclear power in the 1960s, Israel has stated that it would not
be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the region and has relied on a combined
policy of nuclear opacity and ambiguity since then.38 Under this approach, Israel declines
to openly declare itself a nuclear power but signals, through leaks and other
pronouncements, the existence of its nuclear arsenal. Such subtlety, however, may have
fallen by the wayside, since statements by senior US and Israeli officials openly
acknowledge Israel’s nuclear status.39 It is difficult to argue that Israel today remains in
any kind of nuclear closet.
If Israel’s nuclear policies on deterrence and strategic nuclear doctrine remain
somewhat unclear, there is no confusion about its counterproliferation policy. Israel’s
successful destruction of Iraq’s Osirak reactor in June 1981, followed by the destruction of
Syria’s reactor at Al Kibar in September 2007, leaves little room for misinterpretation.
Following the Osirak attack, then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin articulated what would
later become known as the ‘‘Begin Doctrine’’: ‘‘We shall not allow any enemy to develop
weapons of mass destruction turned against us.’’40 It is widely accepted that the Begin
Doctrine and its commitment to prevent any existential, Holocaust-like threat to the
Jewish homeland remains a guiding principle for Israeli security strategy.41
The region’s unsettled nuclear dynamics provide yet another problematic factor for
the United States in thinking through the implications of operationalizing extended
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deterrent relationships backed by nuclear weapons. The previously noted nuclear
categories of states are not necessarily static and are more fluid than at any time in
recent history. This is for several reasons. First, internal stability in the Arab states
eventually will lead to the emergence of new decision-making elites who could reconsider
past decisions to forego the pursuit of nuclear power and, potentially, nuclear weapons.
Second, if Iran achieves either an open or latent nuclear capability, states may reconsider
their nuclear postures. Third, US relationships with the Arab world are uncertain, due to
the emergence of Islamist-oriented political leaders following the Arab Spring. It is unclear
whether the new regimes or the United States will continue to subscribe to the
containment-era mix of military assistance programs that is the bedrock of the region’s
security system. In short, the regional environment is extremely unstable and is likely to
remain this way for the foreseeable future; this is not an environment that could be
somehow controlled or influenced by US nuclear guarantees.
US Regional Strategy and Nuclear Weapons
The uncertainties in the region’s environment and its nuclear dynamics intersect with a US
regional strategy that seems to be on autopilot. Despite withdrawing from Iraq in 2011, US
security relationships with the GCC states remain vibrant. The United States and its Gulf
partners continue to maintain a robust basing infrastructure and mount a dizzying array of
ongoing military exercises; moreover, the arms sales business is booming for US defense
contractors.
Nuclear weapons have never played a particularly important role for the United
States in these regional political-military relations. Unlike the US commitments to Europe
and Northeast Asia, the United States never formally committed to defend the region with
nuclear weapons on an ongoing basis. Instead, the strategic deterrent was applied
episodically in extraordinary circumstances, such as: (1) the warning to the Soviets in the
1973 war to deter them from intervening; (2) President Jimmy Carter’s 1980 commitment
to oppose any attempt by the Soviet Union to seize control of the Gulf as part of its
invasion and occupation of Afghanistan; (3) threats conveyed by the United States to Iraq
in 1991 and 2003 to deter potential Iraqi use of chemical weapons against US troops; (4) a
reiteration of US intent to deter and defend its troops from potential attack by chemical
weapons after the discovery of a chemical weapons plant at Tarhuna, Libya, in 1996.42
In July 2009, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton unexpectedly raised the issue of
possible nuclear guarantees when, in response to question at a town hall meeting in
Bangkok, she stated: ‘‘We want Iran to calculate what I think is a fair assessment that if the
United States extends a defense umbrella over the region, if we do even more to support
the military capacity of those in the Gulf, it’s unlikely that Iran will be any stronger or safer
because they won’t be able to intimidate and dominate as they apparently believe they
can once they have a nuclear weapon.’’ In follow-up remarks, senior government officials
clarified these remarks to indicate that Secretary Clinton was simply re-stating existing US
policy.43
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Clinton’s remarks in Bangkok drew upon a time-honored Cold War template of US
security, recognizing that an intersecting web of deterrent objectives and security
commitments serve the dual purpose of (1) warning an adversary against any expectations
that acquisition of nuclear weapons will lead to regional political dominance; and (2)
reassuring regional allies that acquisition of nuclear weapons by the adversary will not
subject them to coercive influence from that adversary.
The United States has long practiced the art of assuring its Gulf and Middle East
partners*and their common adversaries*of its commitment to their allies’ security
through the continuous presence of US forces in the region and a variety of regional
public forums. The Obama administration has continued the practice of its predecessors of
convening annual meetings with its regional partners to discuss security issues. Following
in the footsteps of the Gulf Security Dialogue, the administration has launched the
Strategic Forum with meetings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to generate political momentum
for multilateral security cooperation that, up until this point, has been happening mostly
on an ad hoc basis.44
Despite an extensive basing infrastructure for US forces in the region, there has
been arguably little strategic thinking about US strategy and policy since the decision to
defend the Arabian Peninsula and evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1990. After the
war, the United States settled upon a ‘‘holding action’’ administered by its Navy and Air
Force under the rubric of enforcing UN Security Council resolutions. The 2003 invasion of
Iraq, initially justified as a preventative war based on counterproliferation objectives, came
not a result of strategic clarity, but from the strategic drift and obtuseness of the 1990s
that then became coupled with the ill-defined concept of the ‘‘war on terror.’’
History suggests an overwhelming emphasis on the role of conventional force in
operationalizing US security guarantees and extended deterrent commitments. In addition
to sales of advanced combat aircraft to states like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates, the United States is selling a variety of missile defense systems such as the
Patriot and the Theater High Altitude Air Defense System to its regional partners. Israel, in
particular, has received US funding to develop its own layered missile defense system
comprised of the Arrow and the Iron Dome system*which was initially reported to have
functioned very well against short range rockets fired at Israel from the Gaza strip in
November 2012, although subsequent analysis casts some doubt on the performance of
the system.45 The emphasis on missile defense reflects an approach taken by successive
administrations to continue strengthening the regional system of conventional deterrence
and defense and to de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons in deterring adversaries.
The Obama administration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) acknowledges a
continuation of this approach to deterrence, which represents a complex mixture of
offensive and defense conventional capabilities.
While the role of nuclear weapons has never been explicitly spelled out in the Gulf
(as opposed to Europe), the US military regional footprint operates with an implied nuclear
umbrella that could be used in extremis. Both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush
administrations had reserved the right to respond to chemical and biological attacks by
non-nuclear weapon states regardless of their membership in the NPT. The Obama
administration has narrowed this scenario and further strengthened these negative
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assurances by stating that it would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states in
good standing with the NPT*even if those attacks involved chemical or biological
weapons. In follow-on clarifying remarks in April 2010, then-Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates further clarified the US position by stating that there were no scenarios of attacks by
chemical weapons that would warrant a US nuclear response, whereas it could make
adjustments in its negative assurances on attacks involving biological weapons ‘‘. . .given
the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of bio-technology
development . . .’’ 46 In its NPR, the Obama administration reiterated its overwhelming
preference to address military contingencies with conventional weapons, and that nuclear
weapons use would only be considered in extreme circumstances.
Importantly in the Gulf, however, it is clear that the strategic arsenal remains
theoretically in play. Iran (like North Korea) today sits outside the Obama administration’s
negative security assurance formulation. It is arguably not a state in good standing with
the NPT; it has developed a range of chemical weapons and long-range missiles; and it
emphasizes terrorism and asymmetric warfare as important regime tools to defend itself.
If anything, Iran’s weakened conventional forces potentially drives Iranian military
responses during an armed conflict to those weapons that would lead the United States
to consider forswearing its negative security assurances.47 In this scenario, it seems clear
that US nuclear weapons are a component in the web of military capabilities designed to
discourage Iranian use of its unconventional weapons in war.
Therefore, the Obama administration’s attempts to stop Iran from becoming a
nuclear weapon state inherently infer a host of additional policy issues that are
theoretically linked to the strategic arsenal. Would the United States honor its historic
commitment to defend the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia with nuclear weapons
through an extended deterrence commitment? The same calculus holds for Israel and
other regional partners. It is unclear whether such guarantees are desirable from a US
policy perspective* particularly amidst the violence and instability that characterizes the
region. In addition to interstate disputes, the unfolding intra state contention and the
prospect that new forms of government and decision-making elites will emerge further
argues against the desirability of strengthening existing security commitments with some
sort of extended deterrent umbrella backed by nuclear weapons.
Conclusion
The United States today faces the prospect of extending deterrence and security
assurances in a political environment in which the regional elites must pay increasing
attention to publics that do not necessarily share their leaders’ enthusiasm for US
protection.48 This is an uncertainty that cannot be managed by US strategic planners, but
it is nevertheless an uncertainty that reduces the political utility of extended nuclear
deterrence in the region.
Should Iran build and test a bomb, the environment could change, but options short
of developing or using nuclear weapons are available. Advances in anti-missile systems, for
example, provide the kinds of defensive capabilities that would help mitigate the threat of
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an Iranian nuclear missile. Moreover, the continued presence of US forces within the Gulf’s
extensive military infrastructure present the Sunni monarchies with a continued political
assurance of US commitment to their defense.
The system of regional security built by the United States reflects a time-honored
template of regional defense and security honed in decades of Cold War experience. In
other regional theaters, nuclear weapons played important roles in supporting far flung US
global commitments. While the strategic deterrent has been invoked episodically over the
last fifty-odd years in the Middle East, the United States has avoided formalizing the role of
the nuclear weapons either bilaterally or as an instrument to promote collective security,
for many good reasons, some of which are even stronger today than they were during the
Cold War. In the Gulf, the dual tools of extended deterrence and security assurances
through conventional forces have proven a cornerstone of a system of regional security
efficiently administered by US military organizations. While the US strategic arsenal today
undeniably forms part of this system as it relates to Iran, it is unclear that a reduced
nuclear arsenal will change the essential realities of a regional system that can and should
remain overwhelmingly dependent on conventional deterrence and defense.
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